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1. Introduction
This research purports to propose an analysis of the contemporary worldsystem. Some twenty years after the end of the Cold War, what are the
main features of the existing order? Are they likely to endure or to collapse?
And if so, why? In order to provide answers to these questions, we will rely
upon a neoclassical realist framework1. The specificity of neoclassical realism
consists in explaining a dependent variable by ascribing it to an independent
variable on one hand, and an intermediary variable on the other. Our dependent
variable being the post-Cold War world order, to apply neoclassical realism is
tantamount to analysing the structure of the interstate system that we consider
to be the independent variable and the nature of the contemporary international
society that we consider to be the intermediary variable. Thanks to this hierar-
chical synthesis, we will show that the contemporary world order is all at once:
• unipolar for what concerns the structure of the interstate system, that is
to say the distribution of economic and military power resources among
major state-actors,
• uniform for what regards the nature of international society, because of
the (neo)liberal values underpinning the norms regulating international
relations.
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It is our claim that the coexistence of these two dominations
—material and ideational— benefiting one and the same set of politi-
cal entities —the US and its Western allies— is far from a coinciden-
ce. There actually exists some kind of a mutual, and even a dialectical,
reinforcement between the two dimensions of Western pre-eminence:
the prevalence of neoliberal norms reflects the material superiority of
Western powers and, first and foremost, of the US; the supremacy of
the US and its Western allies is legitimised and reproduced by the libe-
ral or neo-liberal norms regulating the institutionalised international
political game. To put it differently, the contemporary world order is
close to be a one-dimensional world —a concept borrowed from
Herbert Marcuse2.
As such, this world order is even more favourable to the Western
world than imagined by two of the best-known world-order scenarios
proposed immediately before or after the end of the Cold War by Francis
Fukuyama and Charles Krauthammer. While being overall optimistic,
and in any case much more optimistic than the alternative predictions of
Samuel Huntington and Henry Kissinger, the two pundits had also repe-
atedly underscored what they considered to be the threats likely to
endanger the existing order favourable to Western powers: they warned
against the perils emanating from states headed by irrational dictators,
they anticipated an uncontrollable spread of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, they awaited troubles in Western societies because of massive
migration flows. To put it bluntly: they were convinced that the stability
of the American world order and the security of the major Western sta-
tes had to be secured by assertive policies against various kinds of trou-
blemakers. 
2 H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial
Society, Boston, Beacon Press, 1964.
After summing up the four world scenarios proposed some twenty
years ago, we will demonstrate that, actually, quite the opposite is true.
For what concerns the structure of the interstate system, the unipolar sta-
bility of the contemporary world order at the system level is guaranteed
and the security of the major democratic powers at the unit level is any-
thing but seriously threatened. Regarding the nature of international
society, its uniformity is reproduced and even enhanced by the (neo-)libe-
ral norms underlying the rules regulating the interactions among states.
This does not mean that the end of history is definitely triumphing: in our
last point, we will quickly evoke the potential trends, which may prevail
in the future.
2. World Order Scenarios
H
istorical watersheds almost automatically provoke a multiplicity of
various kinds of predictions trying to foresee the future. Logically thus,
the end of the Cold War incited major American scholars and experts to pro-
pose world order scenarios. Four among them were paramount: Fukuyama's
end-of-history thesis; Krauthammer's unipolar-moment claim; Huntington's
clash-of-civilizations hypothesis; and Kissinger's return-to-multipolarity
model. 
The first scenario, proposed by Francis Fukuyama in his famous end-
of-history thesis, was inspired by his reading of Kant's and Hegel's philoso-
phies of history3. According to Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War, which he
was almost the only one to anticipate, as indeed his analysis was published
some months before of the breakdown of the Berlin wall, actually means “the
end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolu-
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tion and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form
of human government”, given the defeat of communism and the absence of
whatever alternative model likely to challenge the pre-eminence of demo-
cracy as the best regime to satisfy basic human needs: security, prosperity,
recognition. Despite this ideological victory however, democracy has not
triumphed everywhere yet, and the real world is divided into two zones: a
post-historical zone, composed by liberal market democracies primarily
focusing on “economic activity” without “struggle or conflict over large
issues” and living in a state of peace and cooperation among themselves; and
a still historical zone, composed by those societies and states still characteri-
sed by political violence within them and armed conflicts among each other.
Sooner or later, the historical zone will be integrated in the post-historical
universal homogenous state within which “the struggle for recognition, the
willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideolo-
gical struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism,
will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical
problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated con-
sumer demands”. In the meantime, the post-historical West should actively
defend its gains through a league of democratic nations, capable of forceful
action to protect its collective security from threats arising from the non-
democratic part of the world and not hesitating to expand the sphere of demo-
cracy, where possible.  
The second scenario was the “unipolar moment” scenario proposed
by Charles Krauthammer4. Starting from the fact that the Cold War period
had been a bipolar system opposing the American camp to the Soviet bloc
and that this bipolarity had come to an end following the breakdown of the
Soviet Union's dominance over Eastern Europe, Krauthammer straightaway
4 C. Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment”, Foreign Affairs, 70 (1), America and the
World 1990/91, p. 23-33.
excludes the hypothesis of a multipolar post-Cold War world system: “There
is today no lack of second-rank powers. Germany and Japan are economic
dynamos. Britain and France can deploy diplomatic and to some extent mili-
tary assets. The Soviet Union possesses several elements of power —mili-
tary, diplomatic and political— but all are in rapid decline”. He then logically
asserts the existence of a unipolar structure defined by the pre-eminence of
the US: “The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipo-
lar. The centre of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United
States, attended by its Western allies.  … American pre-eminence is based on
the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and
economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the
world it chooses to involve itself”. This being said, Krauthammer nonethe-
less thinks that unipolarity is anything but stable, because of a strategic envi-
ronment characterised by “the rise of small aggressive states armed with
weapons of mass destruction and possessing the means to deliver them (what
might be called Weapon States), makes the coming decades a time of heigh-
tened, not diminished threat of war”. The US therefore has to adopt an inter-
ventionist strategy consisting in “confronting, deterring and, if necessary,
disarming states that brandish and use weapons of mass destruction”.
Published in 1993, the third scenario is Samuel Huntington's clash-of-
civilizations thesis, often portrayed as the exact opposite of Fukuyama's pre-
diction5. Huntington believes that the 21st century will be characterised by
conflicts rather than by cooperation and, more specifically, he posits that the
conflicts concerned will be due neither to ideological enmity, as was the case
throughout the Cold War, nor to power-political rivalries comparable to the
ones prevailing during the Westphalian system up to the twentieth century's
world wars, but by cultural conflicts: “The most important conflicts of the
Número: 12 Año: 2012
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future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating … the Western,
Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and
possibly African civilization, ... from one another”. According to Huntington,
“the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future”
because different civilizations “have different views on the relations betwe-
en God and man, the individual and the group, citizen and the state, parents
and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative
importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and
hierarchy”. It is first and foremost the Western civilization on the one hand,
and a kind of Confucian-Islamic connection on the other hand, which will
oppose each other. Arabic-Islamic and Chinese-style societies do not merely
reject the Western values that the Western powers try, consciously or uncons-
ciously, to spread all over the world, but are also eager to assert their own
values and norms: the stage thus is set for a return of the “West versus the
Rest” logic which actually has been dominating world politics since the
Middle Ages. Concerning the policy implications of this prediction,
Huntington comes to the conclusion that in the long run the Western civiliza-
tion will have to learn, willingly or reluctantly, to coexist with other civiliza-
tions; in the short run, however, it should not hesitate to maintain its military
superiority, promote greater cooperation and unity between its European and
North American components, exploit conflicts among Confucian and Islamic
states, support other civilization groups sympathetic to Western values and
interests and strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate
Western interests and values.
Last but not least, a fourth scenario was proposed by former Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger in 19946. While betting on a revival of historical
patterns too, Kissinger remains close to a more classical approach in postu-
lating that nation states will go on being the fundamental actors in world poli-
6 H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994.
tics. Given that “nations have more frequently competed than they have coo-
perated [and] that there is little evidence to suggest that this old-age model of
behavior has changed, or that it is likely to change in the decades ahead”, he
foresees the return of a multipolar system fairly comparable to the one that
had structured the international order from the seventeenth century to World
War Two. Due to the world-wide scale of the contemporary international
system, this system will no longer be focused on Europe, but will be charac-
terised by the presence of five or six major powers: the US, Russia, China,
Japan, probably India and possibly Europe, in the case of its political unifi-
cation. Guided by national interests egoistically defined in terms of power,
these major actors will have conflicting interactions, and the ensuing interna-
tional system will be “far more complex than any previously encountered by
American diplomacy”, as indeed the US, while being “the greatest and most
powerful nation”, will rather be a mere “nation with peers, the primus inter
pares but nonetheless a nation like others”. Ultimately, the only way to achie-
ve order in such a system will consist for “statesmen who represent vastly
different cultures” to combine classical balancing strategies based on rational
calculations of their respective interests and capacities and innovative practi-
ces still to be invented. 
Traditional comparisons of these four scenarios oppose the two for-
mer, overall optimistic from a Western point of view, to the latter two, fairly
pessimistic: in Fukuyama's and Krauthammer predictions, the world is domi-
nated by the US and its Western allies, be this domination non-material, i.e.
ideological, as in Fukuyama's approach, or material, based on economic and
military capacities, as in Krauthammer's proposal. Conversely, Huntington
and Kissinger anticipate a world torn by conflicts opposing the US and its
allies to either cultural enemies, as is the case of Huntington's clash-of-civi-
lization thesis, or strategic rivals, as is the case of Kissinger's hypothesis of
the return of multipolarity. Another classification is possible, focusing on the
Número: 12 Año: 2012
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substantial structure of the IR discipline and taking into account the paradig-
matic approaches implicitly or explicitly underlying the four predictions con-
cerned: Fukuyama's and Huntington's scenarios are broadly inspired by a
liberal outlook in proposing an inside-outside analysis ascribing international
politics to domestically prevailing values, ideological in the first case and
cultural in the second; Krauthammer's and Kissinger's scenarios, on the con-
trary, share the basic postulates of realism in putting forward third-image
analyses ascribing the foreign policy relations of states to the systemic distri-
bution of power resources among major states, whatever the specific version
of realism they adhere to: the power cycle theory as in Krauthammer's analy-
sis, or the balance of power theory as in Kissinger's forecasting. 
Twenty years or so after these predictions were published, how do
they withstand reality?7 Are they still relevant to better understand the basic
features of the contemporary world? Our answer is 'yes'. More accurately, it
is our claim that today's real world order overall corroborates Fukuyama's
and Krauthammer's optimism and, on the whole, refutes Huntington's and
Kissinger's pessimism. Better still, the validity of Fukuyama's liberal predic-
tion basically depends on the relevance of Krauthammer's realist framework:
liberal values in the normative sphere rule because of the durability of a uni-
polar interstate system characterised by America's material primacy.
3. A unipolar interstate system
T
o claim that the structure of an interstate system is characterised by unipo-
larity is tantamount to saying that there is only one major power domina-
ting all the other powers which, by definition, are therefore secondary powers.
7 See also C. Fettweis, « Evaluating IR’s Crystal Balls. How Predictions of the Future
Have Withstood Fourteen Years of Unipolarity », International Studies Review, 6
(1), March 2004, p. 79-104.
At first sight, to say that the post-Cold War world is unipolar looks
like a truism: throughout the Cold War the world was characterised by bipo-
larity, because of the presence of two opposed alliances, NATO and the
Warsaw Pact, headed by the then existing two superpowers, the US and the
USSR. The Cold War came to an end because of the breakdown of one of the
two superpowers, the USSR; logically then the structure of the post-Cold
War system cannot but be unipolar, because only one superpower survived,
the US. And yet, according to many scholars, things are supposed to be more
complicated. Beyond Kissinger, the best and the brightest (neo)realist scho-
lars in the US, be they adherents of defensive or offensive realism, foresaw
the return of multipolarity after a necessarily short period of unipolarity.
Kenneth Waltz, for instance, wrote that “balance-of-power theory leads us to
predict that other powers will try to bring American power into balance. …
Hegemony leads to balance. That is now happening, but haltingly so becau-
se the US still has benefits to offer and many other countries have become
accustomed to their easy lives with the US bearing many of their burdens”8.
As for John Mearsheimer, in his analysis of post-Cold War Europe he went
as far as establishing a causal link between the return of multipolarity and a
greater risk of instability and wars: “The multipolar distribution of power ...
characterized the European state system from its founding, with the Peace of
Westphalia, in 1648, until 1945. We know that this multipolar European state
system was plagued by war from first to last. ... Europe is reverting to a state
system that created powerful incentives for aggression in the past”9.
Obviously, this sombre outlook has been belied by empirical reali-
ties. Why? Because the afore-mentioned analyses are missing the authentic
meaning of unipolarity versus multipolarity, as becomes obvious when reca-
Número: 12 Año: 2012
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lling the definition of power as an actor and power as a factor. Indeed, in
order to know what we mean when we assert that a state is or is not a power,
thus being able to state how many powerful states there are in an interstate
system and deducing if its structure is uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, we first have
to define the significance of power. 
In mainstream International Relations just as in general political
science, there are two main conceptions of power10:
• power is traditionally defined in terms of resources available to an
actor, and seen from this perspective, a state is a major power if the
resources at its disposal are comparatively superior to the resources
available to other states;
• power is also defined in terms of the influence an actor is likely to
exert upon another actor, and in this case a state is said to be a power
if it is likely to impose its will upon another state and able to get it to
do what it wants it to do.
Positing that the two definitions are compatible with, and complemen-
tary to each other, we can make the following hypothesis: an interstate system
is unipolar if there exists one, and only one, state benefiting from such a gap
in material resources, that the other states are led to behave the way the major
power wants them to behave or, at least, if they are induced to behave in a way
unlikely to threaten the major power's national interest. Put differently: unipo-
larity exists if, and it prevails as long as, secondary powers do not try to balan-
ce the resources' gap that exists in favour of the preeminent power; in other
words if, and as long as, secondary powers are unable, and/or unwilling, to
replace an imbalanced, unipolar distribution of power resources by a more
balanced, either bipolar or multipolar, distribution of power resources.
10 For a presentation of both mainstream and post-positivist theories of power, see
M. Barnett & R. Duvall, «Power in International Politics », International
Organization, 59 (1), January 2005, p. 39-75.
It is our opinion that for more than twenty years now, international
politics perfectly fits this hypothesis: the interstate structure of the post-Cold
War world order is unipolar because it is characterised by an uneven, une-
qual distribution of power resources in favour of the US, and this resource
gap is so huge that it discourages whatever secondary power to try to put an
end to this imbalance by adopting a balancing behaviour.
Let's first have a look at the distribution of power resources11. When
looking at the elements considered to constitute the most important power
resources, that is, the economic resources as measured by the GNP of states
and the military resources as measured by their national defence budgets12,
there is no doubt that the post-Cold War world is characterised by a double
supremacy of the US:
• in 2011, America's GNP amounted to 15 290 billion dollars, and the
second most important GNP expressed at the official exchange rate,
that is China's, amounted to 7 298 billions : in other words, the eco-
nomic resources of the world's second best economy represented less
than 50% of America's richness;
• concerning the military expenditures, in 2011 America's military
budget amounted to 711 billion dollars, representing some 4.6% of
its GNP, and America's military expenditures are more important
than the amount dedicated to military budgets by China, Russia,
Great Britain, France, India, Japan, Italy, and Brazil taken together:
Número: 12 Año: 2012
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12 The tradition consisting in simplifying the measurement of power by reducing it
to the GNP and the military budget of a state goes back to K. Organski, World
Politics, New York, Knopf, 1958.
13 The figures we use are those estimated by the CIA in its CIA World Factbook on
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
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China's military budget amounted to 143 billion dollars, roughly
equivalent to 2% of China's GNP, and about a fifth of America’s
military expenditures14.
These economic and military data prove that, twenty years after the
end of the Cold War, the structure of the interstate system is unipolar for
what concerns the distribution of power resources. Thus unipolarity
actually is a historical era, and not merely a short “moment”, as stated by
Krauthammer. Not only is American primacy in the global distribution of
capabilities a salient feature of the contemporary interstate system, but the
US, already materially preeminent at the end of the Cold War, “became
even more so. We currently live in a one-superpower world, a circumstan-
ce unprecedented in the modern era. No other great power has enjoyed such
advantages in material capabilities – military, economic, technological, and
geographical”15.
What about the second dimension of power as influence? What
about America's capacity to influence the secondary states' behaviour in
order to make sure that their foreign policies are compatible with America's
interests or, at least, not contradictory to them? Any attempt to propose an
answer to this question has to start from the distinction made by realist
scholars between the two balancing strategies at the disposal of states when
thinking about how to put an end to the pre-eminence of one major power,
that is, internal balancing and external balancing:
• internal balancing consists in increasing one's own military resour-
ces;
14 We use the statistics of the SIPRI Yearbook 2012: http://www.sipri.org/year-
book/2012/04.
15 J. kenberry, M. Mastanduno, & W. Wohlforth (eds), International Relations
Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2011, p. 1.
• external balancing consists in creating or joining alliances in order to
cumulate within a coalition of forces the various military resources of
the member states concerned16.
If now we have a look at the foreign policy of the secondary powers
since 1989/91, there is no doubt that neither internal nor external balancing
has been chosen as a strategy by any secondary power: 
• concerning internal balancing, a quick analysis of the evolution of
military budgets permits to assert that nowadays all the powers do
dedicate less resources to military expenditures than during the Cold
War, but that within this general trend, the one power whose military
resources have been significantly less downsized as a percentage of
national richness is the US: in other words, in relative terms, America's
military advantage is higher than it used to be some twenty years ago,
as acknowledged by Paul Kennedy who, after having predicted at the
end of the eighties the relative decline of American pre-eminence, can-
not but acknowledge that “nothing has ever existed like this disparity
of power, nothing. … I have returned to all of the comparative defen-
se spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years
that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other
nation comes close”17; 
• concerning external balancing, neither any formal alliance nor any
informal coalition has been established by secondary states with a view
to counterbalance America's preponderance. The most striking illustra-
tion of this reality is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization created in
2001 by China and Russia together with four Central Asian States —
and former Soviet Republics: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Número: 12 Año: 2012
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Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, p. 11.
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Kyrgyzstan, whose main objectives do not relate to their prospective
attitudes towards the US, but cooperation in the domain of regional
security concerns such as terrorism and separatism. They are afraid of
becoming themselves victims of, notably, Islamic activists.
The absence of any attempt to balance America's preeminent capabili-
ties is the most obvious proof of the unipolar structure of the contemporary
interstate system. In order for such a structure to be multipolar, the mere pre-
sence of secondary powers is not sufficient, nor is the rise of the so-called
emerging powers forming the BRICS-group: Brazil, Russia, India, China,
South Africa. First and foremost, such secondary powers do also have to adopt
a balancing behaviour, either by increasing their military resources or by put-
ting their military resources together within alliances or coalitions, with an
explicit view at creating a balance by reducing the gap between the superpo-
wer on the one hand and the other powers on the other hand. Until today, this
has not been the case, and therefore the interstate system structure is unipolar.
Given the predictions made some twenty years ago, how can we
explain that there is no secondary power adopting a balancing behaviour?
What are the reasons of the secondary power's acceptance of the existing uni-
polar order and the ensuing durability of this pax americana?
The answer to this seeming enigma is threefold: it refers all at once to
America's perceived status as an overall benign hegemon, to its capacity to act
as an indispensable facilitator of other states' interests, and to the internalisa-
tion of its dominance as legitimate by some major secondary powers.
First of all, the US is not perceived by secondary powers as threate-
ning their national interests, defined in terms of security, and this perception
goes back to 1945. Ever since its decision to definitely drop isolationism and
intervene in world affairs, the US behaves like a benevolent hegemon and
not like an imperial power, thanks to its willingness to associate the secon-
dary powers, accepting the existing order, to the benefits of this order. Seen
from a historical point of view, such great power behaviour is fairly rare.
The only comparable example was the UK during the so-called pax britan-
nica in the first half of the 19th century, whereas for instance France, after
its victory in the Thirty Years War in 1648, did not adopt self-restraint: quite
on the contrary, it decided to profit from the window of opportunity repre-
sented by its victory against its Austrian and Spanish rivals to try to expand
its predominance, thus compelling the other European powers —the UK,
Prussia and Russia— to ally in order to cope with this threat to their own
security. To say the US behaves like a benevolent hegemon in its relation
with secondary powers does not mean that it acts altruistically: obviously
the US adopts self-restraint because it is in Washington interests to consoli-
date its predominance in the long run by stopping short of misusing its
strength, but whatever its motivations, such a behaviour pre-empts the rise
of potential adversaries eager to end America's prevalence18. 
Secondly, the US is not merely perceived as a non-threatening super-
power by many secondary powers in the world but, more positively, as an
indispensable ally and/or an honest broker. What is fascinating about the US
is that it has succeeded in winning acceptance as an ally by former adversa-
ries, such as for instance Germany and Japan: both were crushed by the US
during World War Two, and yet since 1945 they are among America's clo-
sest allies. The evolution of the relationship between the US and Vietnam is
just as striking. The US fought a bloody war against Vietnam during the six-
ties and the first half of the seventies, but today Vietnam needs the US in
order to try to cope with China's inhibiting presence on its northern border.
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Even America's enemies cannot but look to Washington if they want their
interests to be furthered, as shown by the example of the Palestinians: they
know that their enemy, Israel, is supported by the US19, but nevertheless the
only possibility for them to succeed in obtaining their own state is to ask
Washington to try to moderate Israel's behaviour. In a nutshell, Washington
has successfully been applying Bismarck's so-called Bad Kissingen stra-
tegy, in making itself more indispensable to any given state than any other
third state: suffice it to recall that even those states that do not need
America's protection or arbitration are dependent on its resources, as is the
case of France or the UK, who need America's —or NATO's— support
whenever they decide to intervene militarily, as happened during Operation
Odyssey Dawn against Qaddafi's Libya in 201120.
This last example gives us an idea of the third reason why
America's preponderance does not provoke balancing behaviour in secon-
dary powers. This reason concerns Western democracies: European states
as well as, of course, Canada and Australia, share the same values as the
US, the same collective identity. Particularly relevant in this perspective
has been Nicolas Sarkozy's speech in 2009 when he decided that France
would reintegrate in the unified military command of the NATO. He said:
“America is our ally, America is our friend”. It is not by accident that he
used the term “friend”: France, Germany, the UK, etc., conceive of the US
as a friend and not merely as an ally, and this perception is reciprocal. In
other words, the Atlantic Alliance is not, strictly speaking, an alliance; it
is a security community, composed of states that do not even imagine
going to war against each other and that spontaneously help each other in
the case of a threat emanating from a third party against one among
19 On America's unconditional support of Israel, see J. Mearsheimer & S. Walt, The
Israel lobby and US Foreign Policy, New York, Farrar, Straus & Girous, 2007.
20 On America's indispensability, see J. Joffe, “How America Does It”, Foreign
Affairs, 76, (5), September-October 1997, p. 13-27.
them21. If NATO had been a mere alliance, it would have been dissolved
after the end of he Cold War, given the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and
the absence of any major threat to cope with. NATO however, while having
been created in 1949 to counter the Soviet communist threat, did not disap-
pear, quite the contrary: it expanded, accepted new members and staged
military operations it had never launched during the Cold War. The fact that
NATO is still alive and well proofs that America's allies or, actually, friends,
consider America's world leadership as legitimate and that they have inter-
nalised the existing pax americana and consider it a legitimate order. They
do not even conceive of the possibility of trying to change this order by
adopting a balancing behaviour, thus refuting those predictions which, some
twenty years ago, foresaw a breakup of North Atlantic solidarity: “In a mul-
tipolar world, the US as the strongest power will often find other states
edging away from it: Germany moving toward Eastern Europe and Russia,
and Russia moving toward Germany and Japan. … We must wonder how
long NATO will last as an effective organization. As is often said, organiza-
tions are created by their enemies. Alliances are organized against their per-
ceived threats. … How can an alliance endure in the absence of a worthy
opponent? … NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are”22. The best
evidence of this refutation was brought in some ten years ago, when the
Iraqi crisis and Operation Iraqi Freedom provoked a split between the US
and the UK on the one hand, and France and Germany on the other.
Suspected of adopting a so-called “soft balancing” strategy23 when they
decided to join China and Russia in criticising Washington's willingness to
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E. Adler & M. Barnett (eds), Security Communities, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1998. On the evolution of NATO, see J.-Y. Haine, Les Etats-Unis
ont-il besoin d'alliés?, Paris, Plon, 2004.
22 K. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, op. cit.
23 On soft balancing, see the special issue of International Security, 30, (1), Spring
2005, and notably R. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the USA”, p. 7-45.
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go to war against Saddam Hussein, France and Germany actually reaffirmed
their solidarity to America's policy once Operation Iraqi Freedom was follo-
wed by a state-building policy in Iraq legitimated by UN Security Council's
resolution 1483 (2003). 
The combination of these causes explain a last important feature of
the contemporary unipolar structure, that, is, its lasting stability. 
In international relations theory, an interstate system is considered to
be stable as long as there exists no risk of major war among the major
powers, which is tantamount to saying that stability prevails as long as “no
[major] state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system”24 by
launching a war against other major states. Given that, guided by rationality,
a state is likely to believe that it is profitable to launch such a war “if the
expected benefits exceed the expected costs”25, the question that deserves to
be raised is which configuration of power offers less opportunities for a state
to expect net gains from its decision to go to war. This question has recei-
ved contending answers.
According to adherents of the balance of power theory, such as Hans
Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger and Kenneth Waltz, a balanced distribution of
power resources is the only configuration likely to preserve stability. As
every state knows that every other state has approximately the same amount
of military force, no state can rationally think that it can easily win a war;
anticipating a very low expected utility of war, every state is obviously inci-
ted to prefer peaceful conflict resolution, thus favouring stability at the
system level. Conversely, when a state has acquired more capacities than the
24 R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1981, p. 50.
25 Ibid., p. 50.
other states of a system, or when a state is suspected of trying to acquire
more capabilities than the rest and is perceived as being potentially able to
put an end to the existing balance, then the risks of war are higher, the
ensuing war being either a major war, in the case the imbalance is effective,
or a limited adjustment war in the case the imbalance is anticipated. Within
this balance of power theory, authors such as Morgenthau or Kissinger think
that multipolarity is a more stability-prone structure, whereas theorists such
as Waltz are in favour of the stability-through-bipolarity thesis. According
to the former two, in a multipolar balance, which exists when the internatio-
nal system is constituted by at least three great powers roughly equal in
force, every state is incited to adopt a prudent foreign policy. First of all,
because there are no rigid alliance patterns among the great powers: a state
has neither eternal friends nor perpetual enemies, but only temporary allies,
which can become rivals, and opponents, which can transform into allies
according to the national interest they pursue. The uncertainty felt by every
state because of the possibility of crosscutting loyalties favours prudence.
Moreover, because of the relatively high number of great powers in a mul-
tipolar system —at least three—, there are always sufficient third powers
that accept to play the role of an intermediate broker, thus favouring diplo-
matic conflict resolution. According to Waltz, bipolar structures, in which
two powers dominate all the other states and force them to adhere to one or
the other of the two alliances created by the prevailing powers, it is the rigi-
dity of the system that favours stability. Given that in such a system the two
great powers have interests everywhere in the world, they are not merely
prudent in their direct relationship, but also control their smaller allies in
order not to be dragged into an armed conflict by an imprudent member of
their own camp. Furthermore, as there are only two powers, the behaviour
of smaller powers withdrawing from their alliance in order to become neu-
tral or even to join the enemy’s alliance does not significantly change the
overall power distribution, because in a bipolar system, by definition, the
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allies are weak compared to the two dominating powers. Finally, it is much
easier for each superpower to know exactly what the other may be tempted
to do than when there are a lot of contenders to keep under scrutiny. This
certainty concerning the behaviour of the other superpower avoids the risks
of misperceptions, which often contribute to the escalation of disputes into
armed conflicts.
According to power cycles theorists, such as Kenneth Organski and
his disciples of the power transition theory on the one hand26, and Robert
Gilpin and his hegemonic war theory on the other hand, it is precisely the
highest possible degree of certainty held by all the states in a unipolar
system which, according to them, explains that this structure is the most sta-
ble. Indeed, in a unipolar structure characterised by an unequal distribution
of power resources, no power, whether major or secondary, is tempted to
believe that it might be in its interest to try to change the system by laun-
ching a war: 
• secondary powers, lacking significant military capabilities, cannot
expect a positive utility of resorting to violence, and thus they stop
short of challenging the existing stability military;
• the dominant power does not need to resort to arms in order to main-
tain the existing order, because it can impose its will by the mere
reputation of its power capacities, and furthermore it is not in its inte-
rest to wage wars, because by expanding militarily it would increase
the security dilemma of the secondary powers which could be temp-
ted to balance against it instead of bandwagoning with it and beha-
ving like satisfied powers27. 
26 See K. Organski & J. Kugler, The War Ledger, Chicago, The University of Chicago
Press, 1980, and R. Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st
Century, New York, Chatham House, 2000.  
27 See W. Wohlforth, «The Stability of a Unipolar World», International Security, 24
(1), Spring 1999, p. 5-41.
Let's now evaluate these theories. For what concerns their logical
coherence, the balance of power theory contradicts the bedrock assumptions
of realism, and more precisely Hobbes’s conception of the state of war. In
Hobbes’ Leaviathan, in the state of nature men are in a state of war not merely
because of their egoism and jealousy and their will to power, but because of
their equality: “Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of body and
mind as that … the difference between man and man is not so considerable as
that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may
not pretend as well as he. … From this equality of ability arises equality of
hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same
thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and
in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and some-
times their delectation only) endeavour to destroy or subdue one another” (our
emphasis). If Hobbes is right, if the roots of the state of war among men have
to be found in their “equality of ability”, and if states are “but artificial men”
as Hobbes asserts, then the equality of states, synonymous with a balance of
power among them, is a cause of war, and not of stability. In Hobbes' theory,
the stability of a political system and the security of every member of the
system are only imaginable when there is an inequality of ability thanks to the
presence of a sovereign authority —the Leviathan actually— above the mem-
bers of the system. Given that there can be no such Leviathan above states in
the international environment characterised by anarchy, stability has to be pro-
moted by an ersatz of central authority, and this ersatz is the preeminent power
playing a comparable stabilising role thanks to the deterring effect of its pre-
ponderant capabilities. 
The power cycle theory is also empirically more relevant, because the
explanation it provides for the alternative occurring of war and peace is more
coherent than the contending explanations proposed by the balance of power
theory. In the first one hundred and fifty years following the Westphalian
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Treaties, the European-centred international system was multipolar, but any-
thing but stable. The roughly equal distribution of material resources provoked
never-ending rivalries for the leadership of the system and ended up in regu-
larly occurring wars opposing France, Spain, Austria, the United Provinces,
Great Britain, to name but the greatest powers, committed to shifting alliances
and guided by the will to become the successors of the hegemonic Habsburgs.
Stability eventually occurred after Napoleon's definitive defeat. According to
the adherents of the balance of power theory, the stability of the nineteenth
century was due to the multipolar distribution of power among the five major
powers concerned: the UK, Russia, France, Austria and Prussia. This state-
ment, however, neglects the hidden realities of the nineteenth century system,
composed by one dominant nation, Great Britain, and the four Continental
powers. As indeed Great Britain did not accumulate more power than all the
other states taken together, the then existing power configuration was not
inconsistent with the definition of the balance of power; but as the four conti-
nental powers did not form a coalition against the United Kingdom but rather
fought amongst each other, for instance during the Crimean War or the wars of
the Italian and German unifications, the net result of the distribution of power
was a unipolar, imbalanced, structure of the worldwide system, coexisting with
a multipolar, balanced, structure of the regional Continental system. 
This unipolar structure is acknowledged by the power cycle which the-
refore is convincing when explaining the nineteenth century's stability by the
Pax Britannica and when ascribing the cycle of the two world wars to the rela-
tive decline of the British preponderance, due to its imperial overstretch and
to the rise of a dissatisfied Germany, first imperial then Nazi, eager to replace
the UK on top of the world. The power cycle theory also explains the structu-
re of the post-World War Two system. This system was bipolar for what con-
cerns its military structure, but the power configuration was unequal for what
concerns the economic resources, characterised by a huge gap in favour of the
US, as indeed the Soviet GNP reached, at best, only 50% of America's rich-
ness: because of the balance of terror, the system was perceived to be unsta-
ble, but actually the risks of a major war were very low, given the incapacity
of the USSR to be a credible contender of America's superiority. Once the
USSR, under Gorbachev's administration, acknowledged its incapacity to cha-
llenge America's pre-eminence, the Cold War came to a peaceful end, and ever
since then, the system is at once objectively unipolar and inter-subjectively
acknowledged as such.
The logical consequence of this unipolarity is the stability of the con-
temporary interstate system, synonymous with a long peace among the major
powers, the US on the one hand, the secondary powers on the other. The limi-
ted and short wars fought by the US and its allies against Iraq, Yugoslavia,
Afghanistan and Libya do not refute this analysis, for the very simple reason
that with the exception of Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, they
were chosen and not necessary wars28. Waged against so-called rogue regimes
guilty of, mainly, inappropriate conduct against their own populations, and not
against secondary powers likely to embody a threat against the prevailing hie-
rarchy, these wars of intervention actually corroborate our analysis:
• firstly because the fact that the US and its allies can afford to wage
such wars indirectly proves that no imminent threat endangers the uni-
polar structure;
• secondly because these wars are the normative counterpart of the
Western states' material primacy.
It is this dimension that we will analyse in our next point, relative to the
undergoing process of uniformisation of the contemporary international
society.
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4. A uniform international society
hereas an international system is traditionally defined as a set of sta-
tes having sufficiently regular interactions with one another “to
make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculations of the
other”, an international society “exists when a group of states, conscious of
certain common interests and values, form a society in the sense that they
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations
with one another, and share in the working of common institutions”29, with
a view to regulating their interactions peacefully through diplomacy, nego-
tiation, dialogue and compromise, rather than through warfare. 
Such an international society has existed since the Westphalian
Treaties in 1648. By signing these treaties, the warring parties of the Thirty
Years War definitely put an end to the Respublica Christiana and aimed at
maintaining the stability of the international order at the systemic level and
preserving the security of its individual members at the unit level thanks to
the establishment of two basic rules:
• the sovereignty principle,
• the just war norm. 
The sovereignty principle had an external and an internal dimension.
The external dimension, rex est imperatur in regno suo, specified that states
were no subject to whatever political authority above them, but independent
from each other and equal to each other. The internal dimension, cujus regio
ejus religio, was referring to the non-interference norm, according to which
no state had the right to intervene in the matters within the domestic juris-
diction of another state. Today, the two dimension of the sovereignty princi-
W
29 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Basingstoke,
MacMillan, 1977, p. 10, 13.
ple are explicitly acknowledged in the UN, whose General Assembly is
functioning on the basis of the 'one state one vote' practice, and whose arti-
cle 2.7 of the Charter recalls that “nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”, a postulate fairly often
reconfirmed since 1945, for instance in the UN Assembly General
Resolution 1514 (XV) relative to the right of self-determination adopted in
1960.
Concerning the just war norm, only defensive wars waged by sove-
reign entities in order to repulse an attack or to cope with an imminent thre-
at were considered to be legitimate, as specified by one of the founding
fathers of modern international law, Emer de Vattel: “The foundation, or
cause, of every just war is injury, either already done or threatened. The jus-
tificatory reasons for war show that an injury has been received, or so far
threatened as to authorize a prevention of it by arms”. Until World War
One, this just war doctrine was directly linked to the balance of power prac-
tice: the aim pursued was less international peace than international stabi-
lity, and every state invoked the norm unilaterally, according to its own
national interest. Things have evolved under the impulse of Woodrow
Wilson's liberalism revisited by Franklin D. Roosevelt. The League of
Nations Charter and, above all, the United Nations Charter, were no longer
merely eager to limit the use of force, but aimed at forbidding it: wars —
other than defensive ones and pre-emptive strikes which, everything else
being equal, go on being considered legitimate— are nowadays stigmatised
as crimes of aggression and definitely no longer perceived to be the mere
continuation of policy by other means that used to be the case in the past.
Furthermore, the established collective security system introduced multila-
teralism: the UN Security Council is the only authority legitimate to allow
the waging of what Hugo Grotius had called “solemn wars”, in determining
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the existence or not of any threat to peace or act of aggression and in deci-
ding what measures should be taken in order to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security.
According to Hedley Bull and Adam Watson30, this Westphalian
society has been genuinely international, i.e. at the same time universal and
pluralist. Pluralist because it is hinged upon the Grotian principle of all the
states' equal sovereignty: whatever their size, power, regime or location, all
its members contribute to establish appropriate norms of conduct. Universal
because it is a worldwide society. Despite its European origins, the interna-
tional society progressively expanded geographically to include the whole
planet earth, and the existence of the UN proves the contemporary interna-
tional society's universal scope. The combination of pluralism and universa-
lism tends to indicate it is their shared interest, rather than their collective
identity, that incited states to create such an international society: given the
various, pretty often incompatible, values held by states all over the world,
the sharing of a common interest to cooperate was the necessary condition
for states to agree in establishing generally accepted rules liable to regulate
their interactions and to be respected most of the time. In other words,
Westphalia and its contemporary institutionalisation in the form of the UN,
are first and foremost rational undertakings, aiming at permitting all the sta-
tes to better satisfy their common interest in systemic stability and their
national interest in gains through cooperation, rather than normative under-
takings, aiming at permitting some states to better spread their values to
other entities.
Proposed during the sixties and seventies, and as such shaped by
the context of both the Cold War rivalry and the prevalence of anti-colo-
30 H. Bull & A. Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1984; A. Watson, The Evolution of International Society,
London, Routledge, 1992.
nialism, Hedley Bull's interpretation has, as a whole, been corroborated
during the first post-Cold War war, that is Operation Desert Storm autho-
rised by UN resolution 678 (1990) and launched by the US and its allies,
both Western and non-Western, in order to re-establish Kuwait's violated
sovereignty. Proclaiming in his “New World Order” speech held on
September 11, 1991, that “out of these troubled times, a new world order
can emerge, … a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jun-
gle”, George H. Bush announced that he acted in accordance with those
Westphalian or Lockean norms central to the pluralist conception of inter-
national society. Operation Desert Storm was indeed decided in confor-
mity with the substantial and procedural points of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter: immediately after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council
“determined” that there was an “act of aggression” tantamount to a “bre-
ach of peace” on the part of Iraq; in its resolution 661 (1990), it decided
to take “measures not involving the use of armed force” by imposing an
economic embargo and allowing the deployment of Operation Desert
Shield, in the hope that these measures would force Baghdad to withdraw
its army; in Resolution 678 adopted on 29th November, 1990, it finally
considered that these measures “have proved to be inadequate” and conse-
quently decided to allow the United Nations member states to resort to
armed violence in order to help Kuwait recover its sovereignty.
Furthermore, Operation Desert Storm was limited to re-establishing the
status quo ante, as the armies acting on the basis of the UN resolution
were merely commissioned to force Iraqi troops to withdraw from Kuwait:
the only objective pursued by Operation Desert Storm was to defend the
violated sovereignty principle, not to provoke a regime change, and despi-
te some pressures within the Bush administration to profit from the win-
dow of opportunity provided by Operation Desert Storm to conquer
Baghdad and to put an end to Saddam Hussein's regime, this limit was res-
pected.
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Some years later, when the US, sometimes within the formal frame-
work of NATO and other times at the head of coalitions of the willing, deci-
ded to send troops first to Bosnia and Kosovo, then to Afghanistan and once
again to Iraq, and finally to Libya, the objectives pursued, and the underl-
ying conception of international society, were no longer the same. A quick
look at the reasons legitimating these operations tells us that these motiva-
tions were relative to what French doctors such as Bernard Kouchner called
the duty to interfere as opposed to the non-interference principle, to what
Canada and other middle powers named human security as opposed to natio-
nal security, to what the former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
Gareth Evans referred to as the responsibility to protect as opposed to
domestic jurisdiction. Nuances probably exist between these norms, but
they ultimately refer to one idea, namely that a state's sovereignty is less
important than its responsibility: in 1999, Kofi Annan put it bluntly when
comparing “two concepts of sovereignty”, “state sovereignty” and “indivi-
dual sovereignty”, and when he asserted the primacy of the latter by arguing
that “states are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of
their peoples, and not vice-versa”31.
Annan's statement perfectly mirrors the contemporary Zeitgeist cha-
racterised by a neo-liberal re-reading of existing norms. As a matter of fact,
a thorough look at the UN Charter permits to see that it explicitly contains
the principles on the basis of which the contemporary wars of intervention
are justified: the preamble to the UN Charter proclaims its “faith in funda-
mental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”; article 1 sti-
pulates that the achievement of “international co-operation in solving inter-
national problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charac-
31 Quoted in W. Bain, Between Anarchy and Society. Trusteeship and the
Obligations of Power, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 190.
ter, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fun-
damental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion”, is one of the United Nations’ purposes. Throughout the Cold War,
these principles were neglected, because of the then prevailing international
Zeitgeist favourable to the sovereignty norm and the non-interference prin-
ciple, but since the end of the Cold War, they are rediscovered, asserting that
the non-interference principle had resulted in some governments killing
their own people. The US and its Western allies came to the conclusion that
the non-interference principle could no longer be invoked by governments
tempted to crack down on their own population and that, consequently, those
who would nevertheless massively violate basic human rights, would expo-
se themselves to military interventions in their domestic affairs. 
At first sight thus, operations Allied Force in Bosnia, Deliberate
Force in Kosovo, Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Iraqi Freedom in Iraq,
and Odyssey Dawn in Libya seem less to go beyond traditional Lockean
norms than they represent the substitution of one Lockean value that has
been re-discovered —the human rights of individuals— for another one
considered to produce perverse effects —the domestic sovereignty of state.
However, to satisfy oneself with this interpretation omits what might be
called the dark side of Locke's political thought, representative, when
applied to international relations, of the “moral backwardness of the inter-
national society”32. 
In the chapter dealing with property in his Treatise on Civil
Government, Locke wrote that “in the beginning, all the world was
America”, an allusion to indigenous societies in the Western hemisphere
where there was no private property, no money, etc. To some extent this sen-
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tence reminds us of Hobbes' statement depicting the “life of man” in the
state of nature as being “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”, and specif-
ying that “the savage people in many places of America ... live at this day in
that brutish manner”, all the more so since Locke, just as Hobbes, was
influenced by the picture of American Indians transmitted to Europeans by
European travellers and settlers from Christopher Columbus onwards.
However, there is a second sentence, which makes all the difference betwe-
en Locke and Hobbes. According to Locke, the American Indians provide “a
pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe”. In other words, Locke posited
the existence of a kind of teleological progress of mankind towards some
end of history, and along this historical evolution, he estimated that
European entities had made more progress than non-European ones.
By establishing a distinction between domestic societies acknowled-
ging the right to private property and societies ignorant of this institution, as
well as by establishing a hierarchy favourable to the first and detrimental to
the second, Locke summed up the then prevailing solidarist —rather than
pluralist— conception of international society whose concrete substance
was twofold:
• international society actually was limited to Europe because only
European states shared the same values,
• Europeans had the right and the duty to show non-European entities
the way to progress by diffusing their values – in his case the institu-
tion of private property. 
As such, Locke was representative of the typically Western “orienta-
list”33 tradition, including thinkers from Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco
Suarez to Karl Marx and J. S. Mill, according to which the world was divided
in the European international society on the one hand, and the world beyond
33 E. Said, Orientalism, London, Vintage Books, 1979.
the line of this European international society on the other, or, put differently,
between 'us' and 'them', accompanied by a way of looking at 'them' not as they
actually were or as they perceived themselves, but as 'we' liked 'them' to be.
In this way, the non-European peoples were successively perceived as hea-
thens during the Spanish Age of the first 'discoveries', as savages during the
French Age of the conquest mainly of North America and as uncivilised
during the British Age of the imperialist penetration into Africa and Asia.
The overall behaviour of the Spaniards, the French and the British
toward the indigenous peoples they encountered during their conquests was
of course variable: the Spaniards proceeded with subjugation, the French with
integration and the British with extermination34. The legitimating juridical
framework embedding their military conquests, territorial occupation, econo-
mic exploitation and political dominance evolved throughout the centuries: in
the Spanish Age, natural law was appealed to in order to justify the necessity
of converting the heathens to Christianity; in the French Age, the public law
of Europe provided the legal framework of the Europeans' right to appropria-
te the non-cultivated lands —terra nullius— of Indian tribes; in the British
Age, international law aiming at promoting the “common welfare of all civi-
lized nations”35 was invoked when the Ottoman Empire, China and Japan
were forced to adopt the standard of civilization before being admitted to the
family of nations36. But beyond these specificities, one common point cha-
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racterised the whole set of interactions between European powers and
entities beyond the line: conceived of as different, they were treated diffe-
rently.
In the domain of peace and war, there was “no peace beyond the line”,
to quote Sir Francis Drake: whereas in Europe war was conceived of as an
ultima ratio, resorted to once diplomacy had failed and used to resolve con-
flict of interests between justi hostes recognising each other’s right to exist
independently as sovereign units, resort to violence was the prima ratio, the
normal instrument, when Europeans dealt with non-Europeans; whereas
Europeans within their mutual interactions forbade themselves to invoke reli-
gious differences as legitimate motives to intervene in other states' domestic
affairs, they justified their interventions overseas by referring to, precisely,
the differences separating the entities concerned from the level of faith, rea-
son or civilization they themselves had reached. Non-Europeans did not des-
erve to be treated on the basis of European norms for two reasons:
• first, as they did not share European values and as they did not beha-
ve like members of the international society, Grotian norms regulating
warfare could not apply during their encounters with Europeans; 
• secondly, as they were potential members of the enlarging internatio-
nal society, they first had to be forced to adopt Lockean values via
Hobbesian means. As asserted by J.S Mill, who was not merely a phi-
losopher but also a director of the British East India Company, “bar-
barians have no rights as a nation, except a right to such treatment as
may fit them for becoming one”37.
The term “barbarian” used by Mill is anything but fortuitous. The con-
ception of a world divided in a cosmos organised by norms and a chaos regu-
lated by warfare actually goes back to Antiquity, when the Greeks distinguis-
37 J.S. Mill, quoted in W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, op. cit., p. 454.
hed stasis, limited quarrels between Greek city-states, from polemos, unlimi-
ted wars of annihilation between Greeks and the Persian empire, constructed
as The Barbarian. For some two millennia, given the overall autonomy of
pre-Westphalian entities, that is to say the self-sufficiency of the then prevai-
ling empires, the issue of how to deal concretely with Barbarians was raised
only very exceptionally, for instance during the Roman encounters with
Germanic or Celtic tribes, or the Chinese encounters with Tatars and
Mongols. The rest of the time, empires were separated and protected from the
outside world thanks to the erection of physical as well as symbolic walls –
the Roman limes and Hadrian's Wall, the Great Wall of China. Once, howe-
ver, the technological evolution permitted Europeans to sail across the oce-
ans and settle overseas, this vision of the world as a dichotomy was transla-
ted into a Hobbesian relationship contrasting with the Lockean culture pre-
vailing in the European society: while forming a society of states in Europe,
the European powers formed a “society of empires”38 when dealing with
non-European entities.
Our claim is that since the end of the Cold War, the “empire of civili-
zation”39 is back in town, as a consequence of the revival of the solidarist con-
ception of international society due to America's rereading of the UN Charter
and its capacity to spread its liberal values, if necessary via military means. In
other words, the material unipolarity of the post-Cold War interstate system
results in a normative uniformity of the post-Cold War international society.
Throughout the Cold War, the international society institutionalised in
the Unites Nations was fairly pluralist, as mentioned above in our presenta-
tion of Bull's theory: “What was long denied even to states (sovereign equa-
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lity) was now granted to peoples (external self-determination). The distinc-
tion between civilized and non-civilized peoples had been finally abando-
ned, … and democracy was left as a desideratum rather than a genuine pre-
requisite of admission to the society of states”40. The liberal internationalism
that underpinned the UN Charter transposed “onto the international stage
core liberal ideas of the legal equality of the individual before the law, the
individual’s rights to liberty and self-determination, and the inviolability of
the individual’s physical person. The state becomes the individual ‘writ
large’, bearing the right of sovereignty (qua individual liberty) within a
putative international society”41. The existence of the bipolar rivalry with
the Soviets, the presence of a socialist counter-model, the rise of the Third
World and also the anti-colonialist ideology put forward by the US because
of its own past, contribute to explain the retreat of the traditional Western
paternalism. America's position, however, was ambiguous, if not schizoph-
renic, as the Wilsonian idea of a world safe for democracies had not been
abandoned: on the one hand American authorities shared in the working of
the universal UN institutions based on the pluralist principle of equal sove-
reignty; on the other hand they entertained privileged relationships with the
sole liberal democracies in regional organisations based on the solidarist
principle of liberal identity, from the IMF to the GATT and NATO. 
The end of the Cold War, synonymous with the decline of socialist
and anti-colonialist values, permitted the US to “reinvent a restrictive inter-
national society”42 based on common values rather than on common inte-
rests, thanks to a revisited liberalism stressing freedom instead of equality,
that is, freedom to intervene in others' domestic affairs instead of equality
40 G. Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the
International Legal Order, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 276.
41 C. Reus-Smit, “Liberal Hierarchy and the Licence to Use Force”, Review of
International Studies, 31 (1), January 2005, p. 71-92.
42 I. Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2005, p. 180. 
among sovereign peers, and progress towards a desirable end, actually libe-
ral democracy, rather than tolerate differences. Admittedly, the formal
expansion of the international society went on: for instance, o condition was
put to the UN membership of the states born from the dismantling of the
USSR, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. Substantively however, liberal demo-
cracy, human rights and free market economy progressively turned out to be
to the “new standard of civilization”43 of the so-called international commu-
nity, first and foremost in Europe where, in order to be admitted as new
member states of the European Union, states of the former Soviet bloc had
to adopt the so-called Copenhagen criteria: “Membership requires that the
candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing demo-
cracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities,
the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and
monetary union”.
The distinction made between insiders —those states that accept the
model of the liberal democracy embodied by the US and the EU— and out-
siders44, that is, all the other ones, including Fareed Zakaria's “illiberal
democracies”45 or Freedom House's “partly free states”46, led to new world
divisions reminding the ideology of the line of pre-Westphalian or, better,
extra-Westphalian pasts. Indirectly inspired by Fukuyama's end-of-history
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44 See C. Hobson, “Democracy as Civilization”, Global Society, 22 (1), January
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scenario, academics such as Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky proposed a
tale of two worlds, “zones of peace” versus “zones of turmoil”47, whereas
according to pundits such as Robert Cooper, adviser of Tony Blair during
the nineties before counselling the European Commission, the international
scene is divided in a post-modern world mainly represented by the EU, a
modern world composed by powers still resorting to Realpolitik, and a pre-
modern world to which belong the various failed and collapsed states from
Haiti and Liberia to Somalia and Afghanistan48. Last but not least, John
Rawls, one of America's greatest political theorists, went as far as distinguis-
hing five types of societies: reasonable liberal peoples, decent hierarchical
ones, outlaw states, burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms49.
The most interesting category of Rawls' taxonomy is the outlaw state,
characterised by the fact that it violates human rights internally and does not
want to comply with appropriate norms of conduct on the international
scene. This outlaw state, called rogue state by American administrations
from Clinton to George W. Bush, is the liberal democracies' other and its
ontological barbarian, because of its non-democratic regime, and its beha-
vioural barbarian, because of its violation of basic norms of appropriate con-
duct, its “barbarian from within”50 to put it bluntly. While being formally
admitted as a member of the international society, it is substantively exclu-
ded from the international community equated with the family of Western
liberal democracies. When dealing with such outlaw or rogue states, liberal
democracies do not hesitate to practice double standards, as emphasised by
Cooper in an article significantly called “Why We Still Need Empires”:
47 M. Singer & A Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of
Turmoil, London, Chatham House, 1993.
48 R. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First
Centuries, New York, Grove/The Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004.
49 J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press,
1999.
50 R.-P. Droit, Généalogie des barbares, Paris, O. Jacob, 2007, p. 183.
“The post-modern world has to start to get used to double standards. Among
ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security.
But, when dealing with old-fashioned states outside the post-modern conti-
nent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era:
force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with
those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself.
Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle,
we must also use the laws of the jungle”51. A comparable advice is given by
John Rawls: writing about outlaw states that violate human rights internally
although they “are not aggressive and do not harbor plans to attack their
neighbors”, he refers to a society akin to the Aztecs practicing human sacri-
fices and suggests that “they must be made to realize that without honoring
human rights, their participation in a system of social cooperation is simply
impossible”, before concluding that military intervention “might be called
for” if human rights violations become egregious52. 
Cooper and Rawls' quotes can obviously be applied as such to descri-
be the “mission civilisatrice”53-rationale behind the policing wars fought by
the US and its allies against Milosevic' Yugoslavia in 1995 and 1999, Saddam
Hussein's Iraq in 2003 and Gaddafi's Libya in 2011: whether these interven-
tions were decided unilaterally, as in Kosovo and Iraq, or multilaterally, as in
Bosnia or Libya, they were undertaken by “democracy makers”54 claiming to
act on behalf of the international community, but actually representative of
an updated version of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Civilization in their
respective relations with pagan, savage and uncivilized entities.
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5. Towards a new order? 
hat about the future? Will the contemporary order go on prevailing?
How is it likely to evolve? Given our neoclassical outlook positing
that material factors —relative to the interstate structure— prevail over nor-
mative factors —relative to international society— in the emergence of
world orders, we have to start with a prospective analysis of the potential
evolution of the current configuration of powers and, in order to do so, we
have to go back to the afore-mentioned statistics.
As recalled above, in 2011 the Chinese GNP corresponds to a bit less
than 50% of the American GNP, and therefore the contemporary system is
unipolar. If now we take into account the chronological evolution of China's
GNP for the last two decades, the overwhelming conclusion likely to be
drawn is that, sooner or later, the Chinese GNP will match America's econo-
mic resources, everything else being equal: indeed, the Chinese GNP
expressed in current prices at the official exchange rate in US Dollars, while
representing 48.3% of America's GNP in 2001, represented merely 6.8% in
1991, 10.9% in 1996, 12.9% in 2001, and 20.3% in 2006. Put differently,
China's growth is accelerating the more China is developing its economic
basis55, and thus China will be America's next peer competitor or, to use the
concept proposed by Kenneth Organski, America's contender.
It will even be America's first contender, in the historical sense of the
word 'first', given that the USSR was basically a poor power, with huge mili-
tary resources developed on a weak economic basis, which is the ultimate
reason why the USSR lost the Cold War, just as World War One revealed
Tsarist Russia to be but a giant with feet of clay. China, on the contrary, is
W
55 The figures are calculated on the basis of IMF data to be found on
http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm
growing economically at an impressive rate, and it will be a serious challen-
ge to America's primacy precisely because it has not committed the mistake
of dedicating a too important part of its economic richness to military expen-
ditures. This being said, we may bet that sooner or later Beijing will be
tempted to bring its political and strategic ambitions into line with its eco-
nomic dynamism, and the most recent figures, according to which China is
about to significantly increase its military budget, as well as China's new
maritime ambitions, tend to corroborate this hypothesis. In this case, the uni-
polar structure would undergo a significant change and give way to a tran-
sition or parity phase which, according to Gilpin and Organski, implies hig-
her risks of instability and, ultimately, of war. The argument goes as follows.
According to Gilpin and Organski, a unipolar structure is doomed to
decline, as sooner or later the dominant hegemon will be unable to go on
managing the system successfully. First of all because of the economic law
of the uneven growth: as by definition the dominant power has entered the
growth cycle before other states, it is bound to be the first to be confronted
with slower growth rates, whereas at the same moment the secondary
powers, which have entered the growth cycle later than the dominant nation,
are booming economically. Furthermore, as the stability of the international
system also depends on the preponderant power’s capacity to prevent any
minor power from challenging the existing rules that govern the smooth
functioning of the system, the dominant nation is exposed to imperial overs-
tretch. As a matter of fact, it has to invest an important part of its budgetary
resources in military spending in order to finance its military engagements:
as this military burden is unproductive from an economic standpoint, it con-
tributes to the economic decline of the preponderant nation, all the more so
since at the same time, the smaller powers which, by definition, have no
international engagements, can focus all their financial resources on the
growth of their economies. 
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Over time thus, the power distribution within the international
system is changing: it is no longer characterised by unipolarity, but by
parity, which according to Kenneth Organski exists when a rising secondary
power becomes a contender, that is to say develops at least 80% of the
amount of material resources held by the dominant power. Whereas balance
of power theorists claim that an equality (= balance) of resources is the most
frequent feature of the distribution of power in the international system and,
above all, assert that such an equality is a condition of stability, power cycle
scholars, on the contrary, assert that a system characterised by an approxi-
mately equal distribution of resources between two great states (= parity) is
a rare transition period, and an exceptionally war-prone period. More preci-
sely, in a transition period, due to the prospective overtaking of the —rela-
tively— declining dominant nation by the rising dominated state, the proba-
bility of war is increasing when the rising power is a dissatisfied, or revisio-
nist, power. If the rising challenger is a satisfied state, that is to say a liberal
democratic state today because of the USA’s domestic regime and values, a
peaceful transition is imaginable, as by definition a satisfied state accepts
the existing rules established to find peaceful resolutions to the conflicts
generated by diverging interests. But if the rising state is a dissatisfied cha-
llenger, then war is likely to break out via two types of processes:
• war can occur directly, because of the preventive motivation for war
of the declining power: perceiving the prospective consequences of
its decreasing military capacities relative to those of its rising adver-
sary, the declining hegemonic power resorts to arms in order to fight
a war under relatively favourable conditions to block its adversary’s
further rise and to avoid the worsening of the status quo over time
and the risk of having to fight a war under less favourable circums-
tances later – this happened during the Peloponnesian War;
• war can break out indirectly, because the aggressive behaviour of the
rising challenger compels the dominant power to resort to armed vio-
lence in an attempt to stop its adversary’s expansionism, in order to
remain at the top of the world. In this hypothesis, an initially limited
war performed by the rising challenger leads to a general war becau-
se of the defensive military interference of the declining dominant
power, desirous to maintain the stability of the international system
and the existing hierarchical order. This process triggered the outbre-
ak of the First and Second World Wars because of Great Britain’s
obligation to go to war in order to try to maintain its declining pre-
ponderance against an expansionist Germany resorting to arms
against Serbia in 1914 (because of its alliance with Austria) and
against Poland in 1939.
The war that results from the dynamics of power in the interstate
system is not only a major war, but also a “hegemonic war”, defined by
Gilpin as a war “that determines which state will be dominant and will
govern the system”56. This state, able to establish a new system, with new
rules, norms and institutions aimed at and succeeding in stabilising the
system, is rarely the rising challenger, usually defeated during the war by the
coalition of the satisfied powers: 
• either it is a third state that benefits from the exhaustion of the
powers engaged in the hegemonic war: for instance the Macedonians
profited from the long-term consequences of the Peloponnesian War,
which weakened the winners and not only the losers, the Spartans as
much as the Athenians;
• or it is the most powerful state within the alliance of the satisfied
powers, for whom the hegemonic war is a kind of windfall profit,
because of the declining preponderant power’s growing incapacity to
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go on governing the system despite of its victory during the hegemo-
nic war – this is what happened after the two world wars, permitting
the US to become the new hegemonic power it still is today.
If we postulate that this scenario will be repeated in the future, two
strategies are then possible from an American point of view:
• a first strategy would consist in trying to contribute to transform
China into a kind of democratic, satisfied power, unlikely to try to
change the existing order by resorting to force: this strategy hinges
upon a liberal view of international politics focusing on the democra-
tic peace theory57;
• a second, alternative strategy would consist in ignoring the potential
domestic evolution of China and containing its rise by creating a kind
of quarantine line all around it, in order to, thanks to already existing
regional alliances and new coalitions to come, notably with India,
impede any expansion of China in East and South Asia and its
ensuing rise to a regional hegemon: this strategy is based on a realist
view of international politics focusing on traditional Realpolitik.
Both strategies should logically have a concrete impact on the con-
temporary policing wars, likely to be progressively dropped, not merely
because of the minor importance of the states concerned when compared to
the challenge awaiting the contemporary order, but also because of their per-
verse consequences on the likely evolution of this order:
• the first consequence concerns imperial overstretch: by committing
themselves in a multiplicity of armed interventions, the Western
powers eventually exhaust their forces because the necessary expen-
57 On democratic peace theory, see, notably, M. Brown et al (eds), Debating the
Democratic Peace: An International Security Reader, Cambridge (Mass.), the MIT
Press, 1996.
ditures contribute to weaken their economic growth, thus accelera-
ting their relative decline compared to the rise of the dynamic cha-
llenger China;
• the second consequence refers to imperial hubris: by intervening,
Western powers misuse their strength or, at least, are likely to be per-
ceived by regional dissatisfied powers as misusing their strength,
thus encouraging these states to adopt a balancing behaviour which a
more benevolent hegemony would avoid;
• the third consequence is relative to the loss of soft power: soft power
being as important an asset as hard power, the US and Western demo-
cracies are accepted as hegemonic leaders also because of the attrac-
tiveness of their ideas, political regime, way of life etc. and, conver-
sely, the lack of attractiveness of alternative models; by misusing
their strength in trying to export democracy at the point of bayonets,
Western powers contradict their own values and, indirectly, contribu-
te to make Non-Western models attractive.  
Whatever the strategy chosen to try to cope with China's rise, and
whether the international society will ebb back to its pluralist version or
whether it will stick to its post-Cold War solidarist mood, we can await the
contemporary unipolar system to transform in a new great game with East
Asia as the core of the world politics to come. 
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